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CLOCK-WATCHING: WORK AND
WORKING TIME AT THE LATE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BANK
OF ENGLAND*
By the end of the eighteenth century the Bank of England was the
largest private employer of white-collar workers in Britain. In
1783 there were 321 permanent clerks working at the Bank,
more than double the white-collar staff of the East India
Company and ten times the numbers employed by the large
insurance companies, the Royal Exchange and Sun Assurance
companies.1 The Bank’s workers were organized into two large
departments: the Cashier’s Office and the Accountant’s Office
and each of those departments was subdivided into more than a
dozen offices, some employing just a few men, while managing
the Three Per Cent Consols Office made work for more than fifty.
The work of those clerks partly concerned the provision of
banking facilities to the London business community but the
Bank’s primary role by the late eighteenth century was as
banker to the state and manager of the national debt.2 As such,
public scrutiny, and indeed criticism, of the institution could at
times be intense. One response to this was the establishment in
1783 of a Committee of Inspection ‘to inspect and enquire into
the mode and execution of the Business as now carried on in [the
Bank’s] different departments’.3
* I would like to thank Owen Davies, Alejandra Irigoin, Peter Kirby and participants
at the Institute of Historical Research Economic and Social History of the Early
Modern World seminar for their comments on previous drafts of this paper.
1 H. M. Boot, ‘Real Incomes of the British Middle Class, 1760–1850: The
Experience of Clerks at the East India Company’, Economic History Review, lii
(1999), 639. The EIC employed a total staff of over 1,700 if warehouse labourers
and dock-workers are included in the count. Barry Supple, The Royal Exchange
Assurance: A History of British Insurance, 1720–1970 (Cambridge, 1970), 70.
2 H. V. Bowen, ‘The Bank of England in the Eighteenth Century, 1694–1820’, in
Richard Roberts and David Kynaston (eds.), The Bank of England: Money, Power and
Influence 1694–1994 (Oxford, 1995).
3 Bank of England Archive, London (hereafter BEA), M5/212, Minutes of the
Committee of Inspection (hereafter M5/212), fo. 1.
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This committee of three, appointed by the Court of Directors
from amongst their own number, was empowered to investigate
every aspect of business and inspect ‘all such Books and Papers as
they may think necessary’.4 They did just that, spending over a
year visiting offices, observing working practices and interviewing
senior and junior clerks, porters and watchmen about the nature
of their work and the conditions in which they operated. The
Committee’s report, which ran into two volumes, over eighty
thousand words, forms a comprehensive record of the Bank’s
business at the end of the War of American Independence.5
A great deal can be learned from this document about the
management of early banking, the printing and issuance of
bank notes, staffing and security issues and the Bank’s roles in
the management of the national debt. The report also offers
detail about the scale of the Bank’s business and reveals that
the institution had adopted working patterns and modes of
organization that made it akin to a large-scale factory. It
concentrated most elements of ‘production’ under one roof
and operated under centralized control with supervisors being
responsible for specific areas of the business. It charged its
employees with specific tasks that had to be co-ordinated with
their fellow-workers both within and between offices and
departments. Unlike the factory, the Bank had the added
complication of performing many of those tasks under public
scrutiny and at a site which, by virtue of the Bank being the
manager of the national debt, became the embodiment of
public credit. By this is meant that the Bank became the
physical representation of the state’s financial promises and
the place where investors, both domestic and foreign, could
witness the effective functioning of public credit.
4 Ibid.
5 Only one of the Bank’s historians, W. M. Acres, has given serious consideration to
the Committee of Inspection, attributing its appointment to the increase in incidences
of counterfeit notes being presented to the Bank and to a number of high-profile frauds
committed by Bank staff; see W. Marston Acres, The Bank of England from Within
1694–1900, 2 vols. (London, 1931), i, 238. Sir John Clapham made only brief mention
of the Committee of Inspection in his history of the Bank and he followed Acres’s line
of reasoning. He dismissed the Committee’s task and its reforms as ‘matters of purely
internal history’; see Sir John Clapham, The Bank of England: A History, 2 vols.
(Cambridge, 1944), i, 1694–1797, 202. John Giuseppi also attributes the
appointment of the Committee to the need to address lax procedures; see John
Giuseppi, The Bank of England: A History from its Foundation in 1694 (London,
1966), 69.
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One consequence of the levels of specialization, co-ordination
and scrutiny that were evident in the Bank’s business was a heavy
reliance on the clock. Specific tasks were regulated by the clock, as
were breaks from work, and both required co-ordination with
other members of a particular office and often between offices.
Thus the clerks, most particularly those at a junior level, were
subject to a degree of time discipline. By restricting access to its
various services to particular times, the Bank also imposed its
time discipline on its customers and the investing public who
went there to buy, sell and transfer shares or government
securities and to collect their dividends. Symbolic of this were
the large clocks which dominated the banking hall and hung on
the external wall over the Bartholomew Lane entrance to the
Transfer Offices. In addition to managing the time of the
investing public, the Bank co-ordinated its own routines with
the external time-specific routines of the City and the
requirements of the bankers, brokers and notaries who used its
services and wanted the right to interrogate its records.
It was E. P. Thompson who first opened up debates about the
significance of the clock to work in Britain’s industrializing
economy. In brief, he argued that industrialization resulted in
the quantification of work by time and led to a significant
change in workers’ relationships with the clock.6 His work has
been both extended and challenged. It has been shown that he
overestimated the intensity of industrial work and the speed of
adoption of new habits of working. In particular, it has been
argued that Thompson’s conception of time-discipline within
factories was too rigid and that a variety of arrangements for
production and irregular hours of working were common at the
end of the eighteenth and indeed well into the nineteenth
century.7 Equally while it is acknowledged that time was a key
element in both the organization of work and the experiences of
6 E. P. Thompson, ‘Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism’, Past and
Present, no. 38 (Dec. 1967).
7 Paul Glennie and Nigel Thrift, Shaping the Day: A History of Timekeeping in
England and Wales, 1300–1800 (Oxford, 2011), 46. See also, for discussions of
specific working environments, Jeremy Stein, ‘Time, Space and Social Discipline:
Factory Life in Cornwall, Ontario, 1867–1893’, Journal of Historical Geography, xxi
(July 1995); and Eric Hopkins, ‘Working Hours and Conditions during the Industrial
Revolution: A Re-Appraisal’, Economic History Review, xxxv (Feb. 1982).
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those who were employed, it is clear that we cannot assume
connections between the way people were supposed to behave
and the way they did behave.8 There is some evidence to
suggest that workers actively resisted the constraints of time-
discipline.9 Even when they complied, they may merely have
been paying lip service to the demands of their employers
and the clock and still failing to internalize the lessons of
time-discipline.
If Thompson overestimated the intensity of industrial work,
he also failed to appreciate the widespread access to and
awareness of clock time prior to industrialization. Indeed, Paul
Glennie and Nigel Thrift go so far as to talk of the ‘taken-for-
grantedness’ of clock time in everyday life.10 They show that the
workplace was not necessarily the only site of imposition of time-
discipline and identify a variety of sites and occasions on
which clock time mattered including religious observance,
schooling, the simple routines and making of appointments
that facilitated social interaction and the necessary face-to-face
contact that resulted from economic exchange.11 Most notably,
it appears that the urban environment, and especially London,
was instrumental in both allowing an easy access to clock time
and imposing precise co-ordination by the clock. Commerce,
markets, sporting events and other organized leisure activities,
the arrival of the mail and the arrival and departure of coaches all
helped to force people to take notice of clock time and to adhere
to it at a precise level.12 This article will show that the financial
8 Richard Whipp, ‘ ‘‘A Time to Every Purpose’’: An Essay on Time and Work’, in
Patrick Joyce (ed.), The Historical Meanings of Work (Cambridge, 1987), 210; Glennie
and Thrift, Shaping the Day, 47.
9 Sarah Peers, ‘Negotiating Work: Absenteeism at Quarry Bank Mill, Cheshire in
1790’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, clviii
(2009); Sidney Pollard, ‘Factory Discipline in the Industrial Revolution’, Economic
History Review, xvi (Dec. 1963).
10 Glennie and Thrift, Shaping the Day, 244.
11 Ibid., 234–6.
12 Penelope J. Corfield, ‘Walking the City Streets: The Urban Odyssey in
Eighteenth-Century England’, Journal of Urban History, xvi (Feb. 1990), 146; Paul
Glennie and Nigel Thrift, ‘Revolutions in the Times: Clocks and the Temporal
Structures of Everyday Life’, in David N. Livingstone and Charles W. J. Withers
(eds.), Geography and Revolution (Chicago and London, 2005), 190; Mark
Harrison, ‘The Ordering of the Urban Environment: Time, Work and the
Occurrence of Crowds 1790–1835’, Past and Present, no. 110 (Feb. 1986), 141.
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revolution was another driver of change in the use of time and
that bankers, brokers, notaries and investors formed, adopting
Glennie and Thrift’s term, a ‘community of practice’, the centre
of which was the Bank of England and the functioning of which
depended on adherence to more or less precise clock time.13
The Bank’s Committee of Inspection reports, on which the
following analysis draws, were produced through a process of
observation and interrogation. The inspectors visited each of
the Bank’s offices in turn to view the clerks at work. They then
conducted interviews with the senior men in each office to
establish the principles that underpinned working practices,
connections between sections and offices and any problems that
affected the efficiency of the work. Further interviews were
conducted with some of the more junior men in each office as a
means of testing what the Committee had been told by the senior
men and exploring alternative strategies to address shortcomings
in security and efficiency. With regard to the inspectors’ agenda,
two factors made the use of time in the clerks’ testimonies
important. The first was the inspectors’ desire to establish that
work at the Bank was not defined by sinecurism and corruption.
Thus they were keen to establish that each worker had a specific
role with defined duties and that he personally fulfilled the
requirements of that role. The second aim was to gather detail
about the functioning of the Bank with a view to identifying
changes that might improve efficiency. In this respect it might
be argued that the inspectors were conducting what we would
refer to today as a time-and-motion study.
Arguably, there also emerges from the reports an agenda
pursued by the clerks. The clerks, especially the more junior
men, used the inspection to bring to light some poor working
conditions and to highlight what they regarded as their
commitment, effectiveness and service to the public. As we
shall see, clock time was used as an important element in those
discussions and thus the inspectors’ reports reveal not only the
use of time in an eighteenth-century working environment but
evidence of the internalization of time discipline.
This article is arranged around the three above-mentioned
agendas identified within the Committee of Inspection’s
reports. Section I considers the use and meanings of time in
13 Glennie and Thrift, ‘Revolutions in the Times’, 182–5.
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the inspectors’ reports. Section II shows how time was used in the
control of the Bank’s functions and its interactions with the
public. Section III considers evidence to suggest that time
discipline was internalized by the Bank’s clerks and, in
particular, explores the clerks’ compliance with and resistance
to clock time. Banking historians have seldom paid attention to
the work of eighteenth-century clerks and this article, therefore,
fills a significant gap in our understanding of the nature of the
work that took place in early financial institutions. Equally, it
provides a unique analysis of the use of time in one of the
eighteenth century’s most prominent institutions and one of its
most important ‘modern’ working environments.14 The article
does not just inform our understanding of early modern financial
systems. Anecdotal evidence suggests that by the eighteenth
century there was greater concern among the middling sort
about the effective management of time spent in secular, rather
than devotional, matters.15 Yet this aspect of eighteenth-
century life has seldom been explored. The Bank of England’s
Committee of Inspection examined the working lives of over three
hundred of London’s middling sort and offers much detail on the
way they understood time and how it impacted upon their lives.
I
The inspectors’ first aim, rooting out corruption, emerged from the
particular circumstances in which the Committee of Inspection was
established. It began its work in early 1783, at the end of the
American War of Independence and in the context of much
public and political discontent. Aside from war, and subsequent
defeat, in America, the late 1770s and 1780s encompassed
industrial, religious and political unrest and, as Gilmour argues,
14 See, in particular, Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah, Barclays: The Business of
Banking, 1690–1996 (Cambridge, 2008); S. G. Checkland, Scottish Banking:
A History, 1695–1973 (London, 1975); W. F. Crick and J. E. Wadsworth, A Hundred
Years of Joint-Stock Banking, 3rd edn (London, 1958); L. S. Pressnell, Country Banking
in the Industrial Revolution (Oxford, 1956); R. S. Sayers, Lloyds Bank in the History of
English Banking (Oxford, 1957). Histories of white-collar work tend to begin in the late
nineteenth century, notably Gregory Anderson, Victorian Clerks (Manchester, 1976);
Gregory Anderson, (ed.), The White Blouse Revolution: Female Office Workers Since
1870 (Manchester, 1989); Michael Heller, London Clerical Workers, 1880–1914:
Development of the Labour Market (London, 2011).
15 Margaret R. Hunt, The Middling Sort: Commerce, Gender and the Family in
England, 1680–1780 (Berkeley and London, 1996), 53–6.
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‘almost every symptom of discontent and decay’.16 With regard to
public finance, the unprecedented expense of the American War of
Independencehadaroused serious concernnotonly about the levels
of national indebtedness but also the supposed corruption of the
financial system. One anonymous author elucidated:
Reports are gone about of the immense profusion of the public Treasury;
of the enormous emoluments of some places; of large sums not accounted
for; of a vast expense in favouring contractors . . . and providing for a
useless set of men in order to keep up an extravagant parliamentary
influence under the direction of the Crown.17
The most obvious manifestation of this discontent with the
management of the public finances was the emergence of a
reform agenda which would ultimately culminate in the
establishment of the Commission for Examining the Public
Accounts.18 The Commission sat between 1780 and 1787 and
the six commissioners produced a total of fifteen reports which
resulted in sweeping reforms of all aspects of Britain’s public
finances.19 Yet, the Bank of England, while an integral part of
the public finance system by virtue of its position as banker to
the state, did not come under its jurisdiction. On some levels this
is not surprising since the Bank was a privately owned company
answerable to its shareholders and subject to periodic renewals of
its charter that would have allowed the government to terminate
the association had it become dissatisfied with the Bank’s
performance.20 Nonetheless, the East India Company, also a
private company, was by this time under intense Parliamentary
scrutiny. This scrutiny had been both gradually increasing and
becoming formalized since the 1760s. In 1773 it had resulted in
the Regulating Act which reformed the Company’s electoral
system and by the 1780s government interference encompassed
16 Ian Gilmour, Riot, Risings and Revolution: Governance and Violence in Eighteenth-
Century England (London, 1992), 342–3.
17 British Library, London, Add. MS, 38213, fo.137: extract from a letter from a
gentleman in Norfolk to his friend in London, quoted in J. E. D. Binney, British Public
Finance and Administration, 1774–92 (Oxford, 1958), 8.
18 Binney, British Public Finance and Administration, 7–11. Broader reforms were
also proposed during the 1780s but most proposals failed to bear fruit until the early
nineteenth century. Arthur Burns and Joanna Innes, (eds.), Rethinking the Age of
Reform: Britain, 1780–1850 (Cambridge, 2003).
19 Binney, British Public Finance and Administration, 11, 14.
20 J. Lawrence Broz and Richard S. Grossman, ‘Paying for Privilege: The Political
Economy of Bank of England Charters, 1694–1844’, Explorations in Economic History,
xli (Jan. 2004).
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not just matters relating to the Indian states but also matters of
finance. Ultimately, a government-appointed Board of Control
would be imposed to supervise the East India Company’s affairs
and prevent shareholders from interfering in the governance of
India.21 Although the slowly creeping imposition of state control
over the East India Company does not offer a straightforward
precedent for interference in the Bank’s business, the Bank’s
intimate connections to the financial stability of the state would
undoubtedly have provided a valid excuse for interference had its
performance been less than satisfactory and the Board of Control
a template for the imposition of that interference. While the Bank
might have escaped the attention of the Commission, it had not
escaped very severe criticism from some commentators.22 There
is no question that, had the political will existed, replacement or,
at least, reform of the Bank of England would have found
acceptance in many quarters.
It was in the context of increasing criticism of, and investigation
into, the state of the public finances that the Bank of England
appointed its own Committee of Inspection. Moreover, we can
point to an intimate connection between the Commission for
Examining the Public Accounts and the Bank’s own inspection
both with regard to motivations and working practices. Indeed,
two of the Bank’s directors, Richard Neave and Samuel
Beachcroft had been among the Commissioners. Both Neave
and Beachcroft were also in positions of significant power at the
Bank, with Neave being the institution’s governor at the time of
the appointment of the inspectors.23
The working practices of the Committee of Inspection were
also a close match with those of the Commission for Examining
the Public Accounts. The Bank’s Committee, like the
Commission, had been given permission to call any and all
papers it required before it and to question any persons
necessary. Both were empowered not just to inspect but also to
recommend any such changes as would improve efficiency and
21 H. V. Bowen, The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain,
1756–1833 (Cambridge, 2006), 70–3.
22 Bowen, ‘Bank of England in the Eighteenth Century’.
23 Binney, British Public Finance and Administration, 13; John Torrance, ‘Social
Class and Bureaucratic Innovation: The Commissioners for Examining the Public
Accounts, 1780–1787’, Past and Present, no. 78 (Feb. 1978).
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eliminate corruption. Each body pursued a similar mode of
inspection. They both visited one department after another and
published interim findings and recommendations as their work
continued.24 As noted above, similarities existed between the
practical agendas of the two bodies also. Both were concerned
chiefly with the effectiveness of working systems, the nature of
the work and the integrity of the postholder with regard to
job performance and remuneration. In this respect the
Commissioners, of course, were faced with somewhat different
problems from the Bank’s inspectors. The Commissioners were
dealing with a long-established system mired in tradition and
dependent on sinecure posts. The Bank’s inspectors found a
system that was, on the whole, fit for purpose and provided no
obvious sinecures but that had grown out of all proportion in the
years running up to the inspection. The result of this was systems
that relied upon shortcuts and had grown lax to accommodate
much higher volumes of work.
Nonetheless, it was the inspectors’ desire to establish that each
office had set hours of attendance and the expectation that
clerks would be present during those hours that explains why
the starting point for testimonies from each office was the
parameters of the working day. Hence, Mr Bridger of
the Dividend Warrant Office informed the Committee that ‘the
attendance in this Office is from 9 in the morning ’till 5’.25
Mr Landifield of the Chancery Office responded likewise.26
Mr Laverick of the Accountant’s Office, whose task was to
abstract details of old unpaid notes from old ledgers, noted that
‘his attendance is from 9 in the morning ’till 3, when he goes away,
as he takes no dining hours’.27 Mr Osmond of the Drawing Office
told the inspectors that he had been at the Bank ‘about half a year;
that he is one of the Junior Clerks in the Office; his attendance is
’till a later hour than most of the others, & that he frequently
comes after dinner’.28
Temporal specificity had another role in evidence-giving.
Indeed, in starting their evidence with the parameters of the
24 Torrance, ‘Social Class and Bureaucratic Innovation’, 66; BEA, M5/212 and
M5/213, Minutes of the Committee of Inspection (hereafter M5/213), passim.
25 BEA, M5/212, fo. 125.
26 Ibid., fo. 117.
27 BEA, M5/213, fo. 4.
28 Ibid., fo. 15.
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working day the clerks were doing nothing new. Glennie and
Thrift show that an ability to use clock time in the narration of
events, and particularly in testimonies given in court, was
common long before the Committee of Inspection took its
evidence. They also argue that this tendency relates to the
notion that temporal specificity raised the value and credibility
of evidence.29 Arguably, therefore, when the clerks used clock
time as part of their testimonies they were engaging in common
and accepted methods of establishing the veracity of their
evidence, as well as attempting to establish the rectitude of their
working lives.
The clerks were all describing daily and oft-repeated routines
and therefore can be assumed to have a reliable recall of the times
at which they performed certain tasks, but in some cases it is clear
that their testimony represented the way they were supposed to
work rather than the way they actually worked. Thus, in evidence
relating to the management of the Bill Office, Mr Church, the
chief man, initially talked about the full extent of the working day.
He was later reported byone of his subordinates to ‘quit the Office
about 3 o’clock’ each day. Following this revelation the inspectors
perceptively observed that Church ‘cannot be so well acquainted
with the business transacted after his departure as the other
Clerks’.30 There were, however, relatively few examples of
clerks misrepresenting their attendance and the fact that the
inspectors’ investigations appear to have revealed such
anomalies means that they need not invalidate the uses of time
to be found in the reports.
Aside from the parameters of the working day, there were a wide
variety of alternative occasions in the reports where specific times
were used. For example, deadlines were often mentioned. Hence
any bill or draft which fell due that day but was brought into the
Bank after twelve o’clock was recorded in the books as falling due
the following day. In other words the Bank operated a midday cut-
off for the management of bills and drafts.31 The cut-off time for
payments was five o’clock.32 The cut-off point for entries into the
29 Glennie and Thrift, Shaping the Day, 215. Hans-Joachim Voth also noted, and
indeed took advantage of, the prominence of clock time in court depositions; see
Hans-Joachim Voth, Time and Work in England, 1750–1830 (Oxford, 2000).
30 BEA, M5/212, fo. 18.
31 Ibid., fo. 22–3.
32 Ibid., fo. 172.
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General Ledger each day was also five o’clock and the balance was
made up each day after that time.33 These types of deadlines,
a specific time of day, probably operated with some flexibility.
Undoubtedly on quiet days a line might have been drawn
somewhat before a deadline and more generous clerks probably
allowed valued customers to present bills a little after midday.
The specificity of the deadline is less important than its
theoretical imposition and the implication that it was necessary
to facilitate accurate and efficient record-keeping. It also offers
evidence of the Bank’s timekeeping defining the actions of other
parts of, and actors in, the City.
In addition to mentions of specific clock time, a wide range of
occasions and actions were described in which some measurement
of, andobservance of, thepassage of time or the imposition of time-
specific routines mattered. Clerks gave approximate clock times for
the completion of tasks. Thus, Mr Martin told the Committee that
it was not the custom to lock up the drawers containing the
dividend warrants until ‘a little before 5 o’clock’.34 Mr Laverick
noted that it was ‘the custom throughout the Accountants Office
. . . for the Clerks . . . to stay ’till their business is done, which is
usually about 3 o’clock’.35 Mr Jones from the Discount Office
noted that ‘it is sometimes 8 or 9 o’clock at night before they
receive all the Warrants from the Drawing Office of the
business of that day, particularly last Thursday it was about
8 o’clock; that they can never make up the Balance ’till they
have got in all the Warrants’.36
Otherwise generic times were used to encompass broad sets of
activities or to indicate when tasks generally took place. There
were, for example, mentions of ‘office hours’ and ‘hours of
business’ as terms for differentiating between the times when
customers had access to the Bank and times when the Bank was
still active but not dealing directly with customers. There were
also, as might be expected, numerous mentions of tasks being
performed in the morning, afternoon or evening. Bills of
exchange, for example, were removed from the safe ‘every
morning’ and locked up again ‘at nights’.37 Daily, weekly and
33 Ibid., fo. 82.
34 BEA, M5/213, fo. 71.
35 Ibid., fo. 4.
36 BEA, M5/212, fo. 88.
37 Ibid., fos. 11–12.
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sometimes monthly or annual timings were also used to define the
frequency of the Bank’s checks and balances. Hence, waste
ledgers relating to the work of the Accountant’s Office were
checked every six weeks. Records relating to the management
of banknotes were prepared and presented to the Court of
Directors every Thursday.38 Checks on the state of all the ‘great
accounts’ held by the Bank were performed every Monday
morning.39 Checks were performed on the Bank’s four fire
engines on the first Thursday of every month.40
There were also testimonies that indicated a sense of the
personal time of individuals. Thus Mr Vitu, giving evidence with
regard to the checking of bank notes during the printing process,
stated ‘[i]t takes up the greatest part of one person’s time to go
through this examination’.41 Mr Lander, one of the cashiers, on
being asked how many notes he could sign in a specified time
answered ‘about 100 Notes in 20 Minutes if not interrupted’.42
The business in the Discount Office was reported to
pass progressively through the hands of 5 different Clerks, who either
compute, or enter the particulars of the Bills in different books: this
operation takes up a considerable space of time, & frequently
occasions the business of the Office to continue, ’till very late at night
before it is finished.43
Reinforcing this notice of time by the clerks is evidence from
the inspectors’ reports and other records preserved in the Bank’s
archives to show that, both internally and externally, clocks
formed a visible presence at the Bank. Thus the minutes of the
Committee of Treasury in 1777 record that eight clocks had
been cleaned and repaired by Mr Tutt at a cost of £3 and 10
shillings. The number of clocks mentioned here would seem to
imply that clocks were placed in most, if not all, offices.44 Most
of the Bank’s clerks would also have had clocks in their homes
and might have carried their own pocket watches as an essential
tool for delivering them to work on time each day. Certainly by
the late eighteenth century the ownership of both clocks and
38 Ibid., fo. 53.
39 BEA, M5/213, fo. 20.
40 BEA, M5/212, fo. 192.
41 Ibid., fo. 101.
42 Ibid., fo. 117.
43 Ibid., fo. 68.
44 BEA, M5/452, Minutes of the Committee of Treasury, 16 Apr. 1777. Mr Tutt
was to be allowed £10 per annum for future cleaning and repair of the clocks.
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pocket watches was within the reach of men paid less than the
Bank’s clerks and they were likely to have been used by
individuals working in environments that required a high
degree of time co-ordination.45
The large clocks in the banking hall and over the Bartholomew
Lane entrance to the Transfer Offices have already been noted.46
Moreover, the inspectors’ reports reveal that these clocks
functioned not only as time pieces but also helped to define the
physical environment by acting as points of orientation within the
Bank. Thus, the inspectors were informed that the A, B and H
cash books were stored ‘in the Hall on the side under the Clock’.
And on another occasion reference was made to customers being
asked to carry their notes to the cashiers who sat under the clock
for signature.47 That the clock in the banking hall was a common
reference point for orientation within the Bank is confirmed by
The Bank of England’s Vade Mecum or Sure Guide, a kind of guide
book for customers, apparently written by a ‘gentleman of the
Bank’. The guide included a map of the banking hall detailing
for potential customers which desks dealt with which types of
transaction. The dominant reference point on the plan was the
large clock which was positioned above the cashiers’ desks.48
In the various uses of time in the inspectors’ reports, it is
notable that while office hours and deadlines were spoken of in
specific terms, other mentions of time were given in approximate
or generic forms. This indicates that perhaps the former should
be looked upon as expressions of an understanding of a formal
obligation, rather than necessarily a representation of actual
behaviour. There are, however, more than enough expressions
of approximate timings and other uses of the clock to indicate
that notice of time represented more than just an understanding
of a formal obligation. The Committee of Inspection’s report
establishes that some of those who gave evidence did indeed
measure their time precisely by the clock or, like Mr Vitu, had a
strong sense of the personal time which their work consumed.
45 Glennie and Thrift, ‘Revolutions in the Times’, 187; John Styles, ‘Time Piece:
Working Men and Watches’, History Today, lviii (Jan. 2008).
46 Many public buildings by this time placed clocks on external walls. See Paul
Glennie and Nigel Thrift, ‘The Spaces of Clock Times’, in Patrick Joyce (ed.), The
Social in Question: New Bearings in History and the Social Sciences (London, 2002), 155.
47 BEA, M5/212, fos. 91, 120.
48 The Bank of England’s Vade Mecum; or Sure Guide . . . By a Gentleman of the Bank
Etc. (London, 1782).
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Other clerks certainly worked by a set of well-established routines
and deadlines, and understood time management and time co-
ordination as part of their working lives. Even if it may be
suggested that some clerks merely paid lip service to the defined
routines and deadlines, the sheer amount of work undertaken by
the Bank indicates that time pressure would have been
experienced by many clerks. The Committee’s reports tell us
that the issue of 4 per cent annuities during the War of
American Independence resulted in such an increase of
business that the clerks had to open 19,500 new accounts in
one day.49 More than 65,000 dividend warrants were issued for
payment on 5 January 1783 and nearly 59,000 in April 1783.50
The clerks who kept the K cash book, in which were recorded
notes in long lists for the Exchequer, for other public offices and
to some bankers, estimated that they made up around 20,000
notes a month.51 Mr Isaac Pilleau estimated that 137,000 bills
of exchange had been discounted in the course of 1782. Each
discount required a posting to the account with and the
account upon at the time of discount and from the two
accounts at the time of payment.52 At the late eighteenth-
century Bank of England, therefore, routine and time pressure
were inescapable.
II
The origins of this heavily time-oriented regime cannot be traced
but it is clear that some elements of time discipline had been in
place since the early eighteenth century. Indeed, a rule book from
1704 specifies the timings of breaks for lunch.53 Moreover, it
is likely that the modes of working were borrowed from other
systems of good practice that were already in existence at the
Bank’s foundation in 1694. Edward Hughes argues that the Bank’s
organization and management was modelled on that of the
49 BEA, M5/213, fos. 43–4.
50 BEA, M5/212, fo. 126.
51 Ibid., fos. 91, 99.
52 BEA, M5/213, fos. 8–9.
53 Anne L. Murphy, ‘Learning the Business of Banking: The Management of the
Bank of England’s First Tellers’, Business History, lii, 1 (2010), 150.
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Excise.54 Parallels can also be drawn with the management
structure at the East India Company.55 Routine was, therefore,
likely to have been always a feature of the Bank’s work. By the end
of the eighteenth century it is clear that time-co-ordinated work
and deadlines represented not just a desirable routine but were
necessary to facilitate the smooth functioning of the Bank of
England. As noted above, by the later eighteenth century the
Bank employed a staff of over three hundred clerks, was dealing
with thousands of transactions every month and was managing
records relating to a huge balance sheet. It controlled the majority
of the public debt and much of London’s bullion inflows. It was
required to oversee what was, by eighteenth-century standards, a
vast process for the manufacture and circulation of banknotes and
obliged to provide effective liaison with the Exchequer. All this
was done by hand in processes that involved the endless recording
of details in ledgers, adding columns of figures, calculating
interest and dividend payments, transferring information from
day books and transfer ledgers to permanent records and
checking and double-checking to ensure the integrity of the
records. The work had to be managed through the specialization
of tasks and labour. Indeed, there is firm evidence in the Bank’s
records of the ‘subdivision of process’ and the ‘synchronization
of labour’ that E. P. Thompson claimed required attention to
the clock.56
One of the most important functions of the clock at the Bank of
England, therefore, was to define when certain tasks had to take
place to ensure that all necessary tasks were completed within the
working day. We have already noted the midday and 5 p.m. cut-off
points for payments and transactions which were designed to
allow records to be updated in time for the next business day.
But the level of co-ordination required extended beyond the
imposition of deadlines. There were effectively two working
days at the Bank. Clerks worked from 9 a.m. to between 3 and
5 p.m. in most offices to facilitate customer business and then
some clerks worked from the late afternoon, sometimes into the
very late evening, in order to update the ledgers and ensure that
54 E. Hughes, Studies in Administration and Finance, 1558–1825: With Special
Reference to the History of Salt Taxation in England (University of Manchester
Economic History Series x, Manchester, 1934), 172.
55 Murphy, ‘Learning the Business of Banking’, 157.
56 Thompson, ‘Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism’, 70.
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the records accurately reflected the various accounts at the start of
the next working day. Thus, Mr Southey, of the Accountant’s
Office, noted a basic working day that commenced at nine and
commonly finished around 2 p.m. but he said that besides that job
he was also employed, at a small additional salary, in posting bills
and notes into the Discount Ledgers. That business could not
start until late in the working day and had to be completed prior to
the start of the next working day. Mr Southey estimated that on a
moderate day he did not get away until six or seven in the evening
and that frequently he stayed much later.57 Mr Bentley had a
similar working pattern except his main job generally extended
until four or five in the afternoon and then he commenced posting
bills which never took ‘less time than two hours & a half or three
hours, but very frequently 4 or 5. That he is very seldom out of the
Office before 8 at night, if the business is heavy much later, & on a
Saturday generally ’till 10 or 11 o’clock’.58
Timed co-ordination of work was also evident in the clerks’
arrival times and breaks from work. In particular, co-ordination
was necessary to ensure that full cover was maintained during
hours of business. Thus, an early start to the day was mandated
for some workers. This included the porters who came in to clean
the offices and lay the fires and the out-tellers, whose job it was to
go out of the Bank to deliver and collect payments from customers
at their homes or places of work. The out-tellers had to arrive early
at the Bank to collect their lists of customers before setting out on
their day’s work. Clerks in some offices also arrived early to set up
for the day. The clerk who provided liaison to the out-tellers was
expected to arrive at work by 7 a.m.59 The pay clerks were obliged
to apply to the storekeepers in the warehouse for their drawers of
notes prior to nine o’clock to be ready for business when the
public were allowed into the Bank at nine, so they also
arrived early.60 Mr Holmes of the Drawing Office likewise
told the Committee that the clerks there ‘often come before
9 o’clock in the morning to forward their business’ but their
compensation was that they generally had finished by two or
three o’clock in the afternoon.61
57 BEA, M5/213, fos. 5–6.
58 Ibid., fos. 6–7.
59 BEA, M5/212, fo. 13.
60 Ibid., fo. 171.
61 BEA, M5/213, fo. 13.
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During the day, breaks from work were also co-ordinated by the
clock. Mr Collins, the keeper of the G cash book noted that there
were three clerks working in his section and ‘one of them goes to
dinner at 1 & returns at 3, another goes off at 2 & returns at ½ past
3, & the third goes off at 3’ and, if business was quiet, sometimes
did not return.62 Among the tellers in the banking hall, four or five
went to dinner at one o’clock and returned at 2.30, the remainder
then went to dinner and returned at 4 p.m. Mr Campe, the senior
man, also reported that if it was a quiet day he sometimes left the
office at 3.30 p.m. and that he might let two or three others do the
samebut, in thatcase, theywerenotallowed tohaveadinnerbreak.63
There was acknowledgement of the problems of maintaining this
level of co-ordination in sparsely manned departments. Hence, the
keeperof theHcashbookcommented ‘that this Book is generally left
with onlyone Clerk, during the hours of Dinner; a circumstance very
disagreeable to the Clerks themselves, as it is attended with much
Risque’.64 In other offices this problem was avoided by the expedient
of dining at one’s desk. Hence it was noted that in the Drawing
Office, the clerk whose job it was to close the office for the day
‘stays ’till 5 & he is allow’d an absence of 2 hours for dinner, from
1 to 3, the rest never go out to dinner, but if the business is very heavy
a dinner is allow’d them in the Office’.65
Implicit in all these arrangements is a response to the needs of
the public and, in particular, regular users from the financial
sector. This is especially evident in the co-ordination of the
Bank’s work to meet the demands of those whose own
businesses required them to perform oversight at the Bank, or
who used the Bank for the purposes of clearing. Thus, Mr
Selby of the Three Per Cent Consols Office explained the
importance of maintaining the accounts of foreign bondholders
‘which the Notaries come to inspect in the Ledgers, in order to
certify the Sums standing in any particular names. The Notaries
generally come about 5 o’clock & expect to find the Articles
posted’.66 Equally, the keepers of the cash books noted that
extra facilities were laid on ‘towards evening when the Bankers
62 BEA, M5/212, fo. 108.
63 Ibid., fo. 36.
64 Ibid., fo. 98.
65 Ibid., fo. 59.
66 BEA, M5/213, fos. 68–9.
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come in’.67 The co-ordination of the Bank of England’s time with
that of the City was also evident in the fact that, while the Bank
observed public holidays in some offices, in others a skeleton staff
was obliged to attend for the convenience of the customers.
It is clear in the above examples that labour was not only being
co-ordinated between offices and between clerks within offices, it
was being timed to ensure accurate record-keeping and consistent
service to the public. This offers us firm evidence that the financial
sector was a broad community with its own timed routines and
rhythms. Because of this public function, the clock had clearly
become a measure of the clerks’, and indeed the institution’s,
performance. Moreover, deadlines, especially as they related to
the demands of public scrutiny, were in many ways tyrannical.
They could not be easily shifted or avoided and they kept the
junior clerks working, sometimes until late into the evening and
at other times on public holidays, in order to ensure that all tasks
were completed. Linked to this is evidence that for the inspectors,
and indeed for the clerks, the timing of tasks, as exposed during the
inspection, was not taken for granted. It was accepted that time-
sensitive tasks should be interrogated and could be improved upon
and, importantly, made more expeditious.
In the recommendations that emerged from the inspectors’
reports numerous mentions of the goal of increased expedition
can be found. Thus, a plan to revise systems of issuing banknotes
was offered with the endorsement that ‘the Publick will be
accommodated on demand without the delay they are now
subject to’.68 It was also noted that the plan might involve sending
the cancellednotes to the payclerks ‘fromtime to time, as theycome
in . . . & by this means occasion less delay in making up the Pay
Clerk’s account in the evening’.69 Similarly, recommendations for
changes in systems used in the Bill Office were made because the
inspectors observed that ‘this operation takes up a considerable
space of time, & frequently occasions the business of the Office to
continue, ’till very late at night before it is finished’.70 It is notable
that many of the initial suggestions for these changes came from the
clerks themselves, thus offering further evidence for the
internalization of time discipline amongst the Bank’s workers.
67 BEA, M5/212, fo. 91.
68 Ibid., fo. 166.
69 Ibid., fo. 172.
70 Ibid., fo. 68.
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Unsurprisingly, the most obvious manifestations of this concern
with improving the efficiency and timeliness of the Bank’s work
were the discussions in the reports about service to the public.
During the working day the Bank was full of people transacting
business, checking accounts or just using the Bank as part of a daily
routine of business intelligence-gathering. The inspectors’ reports
reveal that customers demanded an efficient service. Thus, Mr
Lander informed the Committee that ‘at present many persons
refuse to wait at the Bank the time necessary to have their Notes
changed & made out afresh, & go away to Bankers to have their
business done with less delay’.71 The reports also noted ‘very
frequent complaints, in regard to delays and inconveniences
experienc’d by the Publick in receiving their Dividends’.72 Mr
Selby, one of the supervisors in the Three Per Cent Consols
Office, explained
that the number of tickets for transfers put in in the last quarter of an hour
before 1 o’clock is more than the whole number given in during the rest of
the day: these take so much time to be entered, that it is usually 2 o’clock or
very near it before they are compleated. This of necessity compels the
Clerks very frequently to desire those persons who come for Dividends to
wait ’till the Transfers are finished, & is allways cause of much
complaint.73
Mr Walton of the Dividend Office continued the account:
The Transfers which ought to be made between 11 & 1 o’clock, not being
all compleated by the stipulated time, interfere with the payment of the
Dividends which are directed to begin punctually at 1: & this interference
is considerably increased by the confined State of the Office, so
inadequate to the business carried on in it that the Clerks are obliged to
put the Books upon one another.74
Notable in the foregoing examples is the expression of impatience.
As Glennie and Thrift demonstrate, this offers us an insight into
not only the use of the clock but the internalization of clock time.75
The Bank’s failure to meet the time expectations of its customers
elicited the physical reactions of irritation and anxiety. It is rare to
find evidence thatwaiting could lead to this kindof responseand its
several mentions in the inspectors’ reports must indicate that the
71 Ibid., fo. 117.
72 BEA, M5/213, fo. 136.
73 Ibid., fo. 68.
74 Ibid., fo. 52.
75 Glennie and Thrift point out the importance of considering how time was ‘taken
into the body’; see Glennie and Thrift, ‘Revolutions in the Times’, 169.
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late eighteenth-century City was a site where time was perceived to
matter more than it did in other environments.
The clerks’ responses to those complaints and expressions of
annoyance are also worthy of note. They were keen to assert to the
inspectors that no special treatment was given to prominent
customers or public creditors. Hence, Mr Miller stated that it
was ‘a constant rule in this Office to make no distinctions of
persons, but to dispatch every one in the order he comes, as far
as they are able to judge’.76 Clerks were, therefore, outwardly at
least, concerned with managing their customers’ time and in
ensuring that delays were suffered equally regardless of social
status or other distinction.
In seeking solutions to the delays evident in the work of the
Transfer and Dividend Offices, a great emphasis was placed on
the management and co-ordination of time. Mr Turner, head of
the Three Per Cent Reduced Office, noted ‘the time for putting in
Transfer tickets might be restrained to ½ past 12 o’clock without
any inconvenience to the Publick’.77 Mr Reeves of the same office
agreed, noting that
time for putting in Transfers might be restrained to ½ past 12 o’clock, &
that no objections would be raised to it by the Principal Brokers: for it
would facilitate their attendance at the East India house & South Sea
house, where the time of Transfer is from 12 ’till 1 o’clock, which at
present interferes very much with their business at this house.78
The above-mentioned examples suggest that the clerks were not
only conscious of clock time but some were also able to think
about their work and their interactions with customers in ways
that emphasized a sense of speed and efficiency. The inspectors’
report also contained numerous references to what we would
refer to as efficiency and was clearly hostile to wasted time and
effort. In this the inspectors might have been drawing on well-
worn discourses of time-thrift. As Thompson notes, there were
many variations within this theme not the least of which was an
idea of time as a form of currency which had to be spent wisely.79
With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to argue that the
efficient management of time at the Bank also had an alternative,
76 BEA, M5/213, fo. 61.
77 Ibid., fo. 44.
78 BEA, M5/212, fo. 55.
79 Thompson, ‘Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism’, 87–9. See also,
David S. Landes, Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World
(London, 2000), 94–5.
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deeper significance. Scholars, notably Douglass C. North and Barry
R. Weingast, have suggested that the successes of the English
financial revolution depended on a ‘credible commitment’ on the
part of the state to honour its financial promises. Following the
Glorious Revolution, public creditors lent their money to
Parliament, which was, as North and Weingast argue, prevented
from behaving as an irresponsible borrower by the institutions of
representative government. This new state debt was backed by the
appropriationof tax revenueandguaranteedbyActof Parliament.80
Of course, this interpretation of the Glorious Revolution as a
significant turning point in the state’s relations with its creditors
has been questioned.81 Most significantly, Nathan Sussman and
Yishay Yafeh have demonstrated that British borrowing costs did
not fall significantly until the mid eighteenth century, indicating that
‘credible commitment’ took far longer to establish than North and
Weingast suggested.82 Nonetheless, it remains clear that the state
was able to borrow significant amounts from its citizens with ease
and at low rates by the mid eighteenth century. A number of factors
facilitated that ease of borrowing, including a history of sound credit
and the growing economic stability and geo-political power of the
British state. It is also important to consider how ‘credibility’ was
demonstrated to the ordinary public creditor and here it is necessary
to note that, as manager of more than 70 per cent of the state’s debt,
the primary contact between the state and its creditors was the Bank
of England. The Bank became the embodiment of the state’s
financial promises and provided a daily demonstration of the
integrity of public credit.83 Arguably, the fact that the Bank
80 Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment’:
The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century
England’, Journal of Economic History, xlix (Dec. 1989).
81 Gregory Clark, ‘The Political Foundations of Modern Economic Growth:
England, 1540–1800’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, xxvi, 4 (1996); D’Maris
Coffman, Adrian Leonard and Larry Neal (eds.), Questioning Credible Commitment:
Perspectives on the Rise of Financial Capitalism (Cambridge, 2013); Patrick O’Brien,
‘The Nature and Historical Evolution of an Exceptional Fiscal State and its Possible
Significance for the Precocious Commercialization and Industrialization of the British
Economy from Cromwell to Nelson’, Economic History Review, lxiv (May 2011);
Henry Roseveare, The Financial Revolution, 1660–1760 (Harlow, 1991).
82 Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh, ‘Institutional Reforms, Financial
Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain, 1690–1790’, Journal of Economic
History, lxvi, 4 (Dec. 2006).
83 Barry R. Weingast, ‘The Political Foundations of Limited Government:
Parliament and Sovereign Debt in 17th- and 18th-Century England’, in John N.
Drobak and John V. C. Nye (eds.), The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics
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(cont. on p. 22)
opened for business regularly and at specific hours, that it
maintained strict routines and more or less precise timekeeping,
and its seeming adherence to the rule of first-come, first-served,
emphasizing the equality of public creditors, reinforced the
message that here was an institution, and a representative of the
state, that guaranteed the security of invested funds.
III
The requirements of providing a high level of service to the public
imposed working hours on some of the Bank’s clerks that were
seemingly more onerous than those enjoyed by many in similar
work. Indeed, the eighteenth-century financial services sector has
typically been recorded as being characterized by work that was
neither intensive nor urgent. Accounts of work in the Treasury
during the 1780s, for example, indicated short working days and
the toleration of a degree of absenteeism. One clerk noted that he
was given to understand that ‘on account of his long services, his
constant attendance is not required’. Another wrote of his
attendance as being ‘in general daily, from about ten in the
morning to four in the afternoon’.84 Barry Supple noted that
the work required of the Royal Exchange Assurance clerks was
not demanding and that the day was broken by a two- or three-
hour dinner break.85 Moreover, the positions held by individuals
were often not formalized and the expectations of the job not laid
down with any precision.
The Bank’s clerks, on the other hand, spoke often of the
urgency of their work, frequently had strict deadlines to meet,
all had specific roles and, as we have seen, all had specific hours
of work. In some offices that still did mean a relatively short day.
Some clerks certainly finished by two or three in the afternoon
which, since they did not take a break during the day and
assuming an 8.30 or 9 a.m. start, implies a working day of
(n. 83 cont.)
(San Diego and London, 1997); Anne L. Murphy, ‘Demanding ‘‘Credible
Commitment’’: Public Reactions to the Failures of the Early Financial Revolution’,
Economic History Review, lxvi (Feb. 2013).
84 Second Report of the Commissioners Appointed . . . to Enquire into the Fees, Gratuities,
Perquisites and Emoluments . . . in the Several Public Offices, quoted in Henry Roseveare,
The Treasury, 1660–1870: The Foundations of Control (London, 1973), 186–8.
85 Supple, Royal Exchange Assurance, 71.
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between six and seven hours. Those working in offices where
business hours were between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. generally
started a little before 9 a.m. and usually took one and a half
hours for dinner, again implying working time of around seven
hours. For such clerks this meant a working day that, although
somewhat more onerous than other white-collar workers, was less
hard than that of many of their fellow Londoners. Indeed, Hans-
Joachim Voth showed that many workers in the capital worked
close to a twelve-hour day, starting work between 6 and 7 a.m. and
finishing at around 7 p.m.86 This working pattern was, however,
characteristic of some working days at the Bank, especially those
worked by the more junior clerks in the Accountant’s Office,
those men such as Mr Southey, mentioned above, who
undertook two separate roles: a morning and an evening job.
Here, excluding breaks for dinner, they might have been
working around ten to twelve hours and sometimes not
finishing until ten or eleven in the evening after which they
endured a potentially long walk home.
The Bank’s clerks also worked six days a week. The Bank was
open from Monday to Saturday. The clerks were, of course, free
on Sundays but possibly many thought, as did Charles Lamb, that
day to be the ‘very worst adapted for days of unbending and
recreation’. It was a day when London was quiet, the shops
shut and even the ‘strollers in the fields on that day look
anything but comfortable’.87 There is no indication that the
Bank’s clerks were allowed regular periods of annual leave.
They were, however, allowed to apply for leave to be away from
their desks for periods of time, usually around two weeks. Hence,
in 1775 the then governor, Samuel Beachcroft, gave permission
for two clerks to take additional time off over the Easter period.88
Governors were also prepared to grant leave of absence to those
suffering from ill health and as compensation following particular
periods of hard or intensive work. Thomas Campe was granted
86 Hans-Joachim Voth, ‘Time and Work in Eighteenth-Century London’, Journal of
Economic History, lviii (Mar. 1998), 33.
87 Charles Lamb, The Superannuated Man at5http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/
lamb/charles/elia/book2.12.html4(accessed 12 June 2016).
88 Jonathan Warren was allowed to be away from 14 Apr. to 1 May and George
Vincent from 16 Apr. to 24 Apr., BEA, M5/451, Samuel Beachcroft, ‘Governor’s
Diary’, fo. 1.
23 of 34CLOCK-WATCHING: WORK AND WORKING TIME
leave to be absent for a month following ‘his long attendance at
the melting of the guineas which finishes this day’.89
The Bank did observe around forty-five public holidays a year
by the mid eighteenth century but some of the clerks had to forego
those holidays. In the Drawing Office, for example, it was noted
that around half the usual number of permanent staff worked on
holidays. Moreover, they generally received no extra pay because
the allowance granted by the Bank for holiday working had to be
reserved for paying additional temporary staff to attend on
that day. This was because business was so heavy even on
holidays that a minimum of seven staff was always needed and
it seemed that very seldom could more than six be found from the
permanent members.90 The willingness of the Bank to open on
public holidays and its ability to staff those days, albeit sometimes
with unwilling or temporary clerks, corroborates the view of
scholars who have suggested that the late eighteenth century
did witness some erosion of rights to traditional breaks from
work.91 It also indicates that financial capitalism, not just as
expressed at the Bank but in the wider City as well, had begun
the process of transforming irregular working patterns long
before the cotton mills of the mid nineteenth century.
In other working environments, there is evidence of workers
gaining leisure time by taking unauthorized holidays from work.
In particular, the persistence of Saint Monday, the tradition of
taking Monday off to recover from the excesses of Sunday
recreation, is observed.92 Furthermore, with or without the
taking of Saint Monday, historians have argued that for many
workers there were wide variations in physical effort during the
working week either as a result of a desire for increased leisure
time or as a result of fatigue from gruelling work. Peter Kirby’s
study of workers in the Great Northern Coalfield, for example,
89 BEA, M5/451, fo. 22.
90 BEA, M5/212, fo. 87.
91 Herman Freudenberger and Gaylord Cummins, ‘Health, Work and Leisure
before the Industrial Revolution’, Explorations in Economic History, xiii (Jan. 1976);
Voth, ‘Time and Work in Eighteenth-Century London’, 35.
92 It has been argued that in some industries this practice persisted well into the
nineteenth century; see Hopkins, ‘Working Hours and Conditions during the
Industrial Revolution’, 56. Other scholars argue that Saint Monday was of late
eighteenth-century origin; see Jan de Vries, ‘The Industrial Revolution and the
Industrious Revolution’, Journal of Economic History, liv, 2, (Papers Presented at the
Fifty-Third Annual Meeting of the Economic History Association, Jun. 1994).
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found short working times following pay days, which persisted
into the second half of the nineteenth century.93 There is no
evidence of Saint Monday or indeed any other form of irregular
attendance being observed at the Bank. Work was also constant.
The ‘traditional’ working pattern of light working at the start of
the week with compensatory longer working hours towards the
end of the week was simply not appropriate to the Bank’s style of
working or the nature of its business.94 Nor, arguably, was it
an appropriate method of working for salaried men. Men on piece
rates could make decisions about their own working time based
on their financial needs; salaried men had no such luxury. For
them the consequences of such absenteeism were certainly
censure and perhaps dismissal.
There is evidence of the day-to-day management of attendance
at the Bank. Like all large-scale workshops and early factories, the
Bank kept an appearance book to record the clerks’ arrival times.
Matthias Alcock, the principal doorkeeper and the man charged
with keeping the appearance book, told the inspectors that he
drew ‘a line every day about 10 minutes after 9, to mark the
names of those who do not come to their time’. With regard to
those who were not present by the required time, Alcock marked
against their name ‘either leave of absence or sickness, as the case
maybe; but for this he has no other authority than the information
given by the Clerks themselves’.95
The factory system tended to fine poor timekeeping, sometimes
harshly. Some owners employed the expedient of locking the gates
of the factory to prevent latecomers from working that day.96
There is no evidence of such measures being taken at the Bank.
On the other hand, tardiness was not ignored and the inspectors
reinforced the expectation of punctuality. In their interviews with
each senior man, they asked for an account of their staff which
included details of their regularity. Thus Mr Clifford, head of the
Drawing Office, informed the Committee that his men were ‘very
regular & well qualified for their business, which was very
93 Peter Kirby, ‘Attendance and Work Effort in the Great Northern Coalfield,
1775–1864’, Economic History Review, lxv (Aug. 2012), 966.
94 See Hopkins, ‘Working Hours and Conditions during the Industrial Revolution’,
56, for a discussion of traditional working habits.
95 BEA, M5/213, fo. 165.
96 Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management: A Study of the Industrial
Revolution in Great Britain (Harmondsworth, 1968), 215.
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necessary, for matters of immense consequence passed through
their hands’.97 Mr Bridger, principal of the Dividend Warrant
Office likewise told the Committee that the ‘persons at present
under his charge are very regular’.98 Of course, it might be
argued that the senior men were merely representing their offices
in ways that cast the best light on their own management abilities.
A Special Committee appointed in 1790 to examine the rules and
regulations then operating at the Bank noted that ‘many evasions
are practised in respect to the time of the clerks’ appearance in the
morning and of continuing in their respective stations during the
hours of business’. At that time it was discovered that leave of
absence was easily obtained and the appearance books
inaccurately kept.99 Later accounts of office work also suggested
that arrival time was treated with some flexibility with a variety of
excuses being given, including being distracted by household
matters and diverted by unusual sights on the journey into
work.100 Extended hours at the end of the working day,
especially during busy periods, do, however, appear to be a
consistent feature of office work in any period.101
Although these examples imply a certain flexibility about
timekeeping that is at odds with the evidence from the
inspectors’ reports, there were nonetheless very few reprimands
offered by the inspectors to men seemingly absent without good
reason. Mr Windsor, who worked in the Three Per Cent Consols
Office was noted to be ‘absent from his place on the 16th Instant,
without having previously obtained leave for it from the Head of
the Office’ and the Committee advised him ‘not to make a
practice of absenting himself in this manner, but to be more
regular in his attendance in future’.102 Likewise Mr Lazenby,
also of the Three Per Cent Consols Office, was ‘examined
concerning his bad attendance in his place, & admonished to be
very careful & regular in future’.103
It is interesting that both of these men worked in the Three Per
Cent Consols Office. This indicates that what can be observed
97 BEA, M5/212, fo. 85.
98 Ibid., fo. 123.
99 Acres, Bank of England from Within, 246.
100 Anderson, Victorian Clerks, 15.
101 Ibid., 15–16.
102 BEA, M5/213, fo. 95.
103 Ibid., fo. 96.
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here was not necessarily a case of obtaining additional leisure time
through absence. Indeed, the Committee of Inspection’s
investigation revealed that the clerks working in the various
Transfer Offices could often be found to be supplementing
their incomes through acting as brokers and sometimes jobbers
in the financial market. During Lazenby’s and Windsor’s
interviews with the Committee it emerged that they were both
guilty of this transgression of the Bank’s rules. Mr Lazenby
confessed to acting as a broker ‘but in a very small way’ and Mr
Windsor stated that ‘he has acted as a Broker himself, but usually
employs one to do his business . . . That he has not jobbed of late
years, though he has now & then sold & bought a little stock which
he has held for his friends’.104 It was not additional leisure time
that was being obtained here, therefore, but additional income.
It was also the Three Per Cent Consols Office that offered an
interesting case of abuse of the notion of time-discipline. The
only office head to be overtly critical of his staff, Abraham
Vickery, prefaced his evidence to the Committee by saying
that ‘as soon as he heard this Committee was appointed, he
informed all the clerks under him that, when called before the
Committee, he would openly & candidly declare all he knew
concerning their conduct’.105 He went on to allege that clerks
frequently went out during the day without asking his
permission or came in late in the mornings and that they gave
preference to their friends in making out transfers and paying
dividends.106 Yet Vickery was a complex character and, in a
private notebook kept by Samuel Bosanquet, one of the
inspectors, it was revealed that a number of clerks had poor
relations with Vickery, that ‘bad words’ had been exchanged in
a number of instances and that there was ‘cause for discontent in
the Consols Office against Mr Vickery’.107 Mr Nesbitt, a more
junior clerk, reported that Mr Vickery had many enemies in the
Stock Exchange because he was viewed to have too close a
connection with one of the brokers. He also noted that Vickery
‘acts improperly & over rough with the clerks’ and that he
sometimes came late to work himself. Nesbitt himself was
104 Ibid., fos. 96, 84.
105 Ibid., fo. 63.
106 Ibid., fo. 64.
107 BEA, M5/471, Memorandum book of Samuel Bosanquet, 1783–1791,
unpaginated.
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judged by Bosanquet to have been ‘intelligent, gentlemanlike
and respectable’, so his testimony might be regarded as
reliable. Other clerks too spoke of Mr Vickery as being a
partner in a broking firm and privileging his own customers
over those of the Bank.108 Perhaps there is someone like
Vickery in every workplace and the rights and wrongs of the
squabbles in the Transfer Offices are not the chief concern of
this investigation. More important is the notion that working
time, late arrival and absenteeism were being used here as part
of a discourse of dispute between colleagues and power struggles
within offices. This is clear evidence that while the clerks may
have been telling the inspectors what they wanted to hear about
their own willingness to adhere to clock time, they still fully
understood and arguably had internalized the meanings of
time discipline within the Bank. They knew that lateness
carried the price of disapprobation and, as David Landes
asserted, that was a powerful notion.109 It meant that clerks
constructed their own activities as punctual but knew
accusations of unpunctuality could be used as weapons against
colleagues who were lazy or simply disliked.
Thus far we have seen little overt resistance to the tyranny of the
clock on the part of the Bank’s junior men. There is no evidence in
the inspectors’ reports of the type of tardiness or unauthorized
leave that might have made staffing the Bank problematic.
Moreover, as we have seen, there is evidence that some men
were working very hard. Some junior clerks took on additional
work at the Bank, other men juggled their work in the Transfer
Offices with broking and sometimes speculation in the stocks.
Although the issue was not addressed by the Committee of
Inspection, a register of clerks in business begun in the early
nineteenth century can also reveal that clerks were working at
second jobs outside the Bank. Several of the cohort of 1783
were acting as merchants of some description. Henry Vonholte,
Christopher Olier and William Mullens dealt in coal, Isaac
Cooper and Charles Stuart were wine merchants. Jeremiah
Kelly was an agent to a Yorkshire carpet manufacturer. Thomas
108 Ibid.
109 Landes, Revolution in Time, 2.
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Brennand performed the same function for Mr Greenwood, a
dealer in patent medicines.110
The fact that some clerks maintained second jobs raises the
question of whether this indicates ‘industrious’ behaviour as
defined by Jan de Vries, yet without further details about the
clerks’ household structures and total incomes, it is difficult to
assess whether this additional economic activity was driven by
necessity or by ‘consumption aspirations’.111 There is evidence
to suggest that the Bank’s starting salary of £50 per year was not a
sufficient wage for clerical workers. An anonymous pamphleteer
writing in 1767 calculated a budget which depended on living in
the meanest parts of London, being clothed in plain style, keeping
barely clean enough to keep one’s place and taking little leisure.
He demonstrated that, even with those constraints, £50 per
annum still left little or nothing to put aside against sickness or
old age.112 Yet while the allocation of second jobs within the Bank
seems to have been reserved for the more junior, and less well-
paid, men, broking activity and additional outside work persisted
as men rose up the ranks and their salaries increased. There is also
evidence of clerks making significant external investments.
Insurance records show that John Holland and Jacob
Coulthard, both members of the cohort of 1783, together
insured various properties and businesses in Lad Lane,
including the tap house of the Swan Inn, a barber shop, a
counting house, stables and lodging rooms.113 Seawallis
Larchin owned a house in Chelsea that was, in 1786, valued at
£300. It was at the time standing empty but had been rented out
to a Captain Pakenham.114 Thomas Nisbett, of the Three Per
Cent Consols office, owned a house in Gracechurch Street
which in 1794 was valued at £800 and rented to a
haberdasher.115 Some clerks, therefore, put their time, both
within and outside of the Bank, to uses which indicate at the
very least that wealth accumulation was a priority.
110 BEA, M5/691, Register of clerks in business, passim.
111 Jan de Vries, The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behavior and the Household
Economy, 1650 to the Present (Cambridge, 2008), 73.
112 [J. W.], Considerations on the Expediency of Raising . . . the Wages of Servants that are
not Domestic, Particularly Clerks in Public Offices (London, 1767), 5–10.
113 London Metropolitan Archives, London, MS 11936/427/740354.
114 Ibid., MS 11936/341/526365.
115 Ibid., MS 11936/399/634968.
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Yet industriousness among the Bank’s clerks also had its limits
since the Committee of Inspection did note ‘a practice that strikes
us a very extraordinary one’. Their investigations revealed that
‘the Chiefs of the two great departments, & the Heads of most of
the Offices throughout the Bank, are the first to quit the House,
some at a certain hour; & others as soon as their particular part
of the business is over’.116 The inspectors condemned the idea
of ‘leaving the charge of every thing to the vigilance & honesty of
the Junior Clerks, (frequently such as are very young in Office)’
and admonished the senior men for ‘not considering it as any part
of their duty to attend to the subsequent transactions of the day’.
The inspectors went on to say:
This practice, beyond a doubt, must have crept in by degrees, for we deem
it impossible that it ever could have received the deliberate approbation of
a Court of Directors; & however Time may have sanctified the custom, the
reverse of it would have appeared a much more natural regulation: for
surely if in any situation of Trust a compleat superintendence is
desireable, it must be more immediately necessary where the Trust is of
such infinite importance. 117
Their solution to this problem implied not a demand that the
senior men be more regular in their attendance but a negotiation
of longer hours. Thus theyasked theCourt ofDirectors toconsider
‘whether means may not be found to enable the two Chiefs or their
respective Deputies to give a more constant attendance at the
Bank, & to exercise a general superintending care until the
business of the day is closed, & the Keys properly disposed of’.118
It is interesting that it was not the junior men exercising a
supposed right to take Saint Monday or acquiring additional
personal or leisure time through absenteeism, but those in the
most senior positions. It usually took a considerable time to rise
up the Bank’s hierarchy. The institution operated a strict internal
labour market in which it recruited only at entry level and
promoted from within. The pyramidal structure of the Bank
meant there were relatively few very senior posts, and the
longevity of many of the clerks’ careers meant some men might
never attain high office. Abraham Newland, for example, held the
post of chief cashier from 1782 to 1807. Senior men, however,
could earn considerable salaries and were assured of generous
116 BEA, M5/213, fo. 173.
117 Ibid., fo. 174.
118 Ibid.
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pensions if they chose to retire. Nonetheless, while some might
have been tending to other work in the late afternoons, it also
seems reasonable to assume that once other men had attained
the highest office that appeared available to them within the
Bank, they made the choice to take additional leisure time. This
certainly seems to have been the case for Newland who, according
to a biography produced after his death in 1807, spent his
afternoons and evenings at his house in Highbury, drinking tea,
playing cards and engaging in ‘free, unreserved communication
with a few intimates’.119
The assertion that more senior men sought additional leisure
time is supported by Douglas Reid’s findings about working men
making a choice between greater affluence and more leisure.
Although referring to workers paid on piece rates, he noted that
the prime supporters of Saint Monday were the better paid men
who were willing to accept a moderate wage in return for more
time away from work.120 The senior salaried men at the Bank
were not being forced to make this particular choice but clearly
were making a statement that previous years of hard working and
additional hours put in at the lower ranks should be compensated
by additional leisure in the higher ranks. Reid also argued that the
eradication of Saint Monday ensured that, within industrial
capitalism, a proper balance between work and leisure time was
lost.121 In the Bank’s archives there is surely evidence of a better
work–life balance being earned through many years’ work and as
the privilege of rank.
The junior men, it seems, had to accept a poorer balance
between work and leisure, whether by choice or necessity, but
did use the inspection as a means of highlighting deficiencies in
their working arrangements and improving their working
conditions. Thus, the clerks at the K cash book complained that
‘they have great numbers of long Lists to make out, generally
issuing 20,000 Notes a Month; & for this Business there
ought to be 6 Clerks constantly, tho’ at present through a
scarcity of hands there are only 4’.122 As we have seen, the
119 John Dyer Collier, The Life of Abraham Newland Esq. Late Principal Cashier at the
Bank of England . . . with a Portrait, etc. (London, 1808), 101.
120 Douglas A. Reid, ‘The Decline of Saint Monday 1766–1876’, Past and Present,
no. 71 (May 1976), 78.
121 Ibid., 101.
122 BEA, M5/212, fo. 99.
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clerks in the Transfer and Dividend Offices also highlighted the
deficiencies in the arrangements of their work. Moreover, the
inspectors acknowledged the importance of their complaints,
noting in their report, ‘a good deal of our time has been
employed in endeavouring to ascertain how far the very
frequent complaints, in regard of the delays & inconveniences
experienc’d by the Publick in receiving their Dividends, are well
founded, from what causes they arise, & to what degree they may
be remedied’.123 The inspectors then recommended physical
reorganization of the Dividend and Transfer Offices, changes to
hours of opening, alterations of working practices and the
employment of seven additional clerks as a means of easing the
burden on these offices and of accommodating public creditors in
a more timely fashion.124
The junior clerks in the Accountant’s Office who were
employed in posting discounted bills also used the occasion of
the inspection to seek better conditions. Having revealed their
working conditions to the inspectors, their approach was then
to petition the Bank’s governor ‘praying an increase in their
annual allowance for doing this extra work’. The inspectors
were asked for their opinion and offered one that was
wholeheartedly in support of the clerks. They recorded
That the 16 Clerks employed in the Accountants Office upon the Business
of entering & posting discounted Bills into the Discount Ledgers appear
to the Committee to be paid very inadequately to the additional trouble &
labour bestowed by them in doing this Business, receiving the sum of
£300 only, which divided among the whole number amounts to about
£18.5 each in addition to their Salary, although they work in an Office
which does not partake in the smallest degree of any present or gratuity
given by the Publick, & are allways kept ’till a very late hour at night: & that
it be recommended to the Governor & Committee of Treasury to take
their case into consideration.125
It is clear here that these particular clerks were selling their time.
They asked for, andwere granted, not a removal ofwork, adecrease
in the number of hours or the employment of additional hands but
rather an increase in the pay for hours worked. Thus these clerks
demonstrated the ability to think of their time as a medium for
exchange and the willingness to allow the Bank to purchase their
time at any hour of the day or evening with sufficient monetary
123 BEA, M5/213, fo. 136.
124 Ibid., fos. 139–42.
125 Ibid., fo. 48.
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compensation. The clerks’ demand to their employer was,
therefore, an expression of their acceptance of the capitalist
working day, a day in which labour could be sold and bought for
the right price.
* * *
The chief value of the Committee of Inspection’s report is that it
can reveal very specific details about the Bank of England’s
operations at a time when it was the City’s chief financial
institution and the centre of the edifice of public credit. What is
shown very clearly is the extent to which time mattered in the
operation of this business. The working day at the Bank was
characterized by regular, and sometimes long, hours. The
clerks’ labour was time-oriented rather than task-oriented and
controlled by the need to co-ordinate work and deadlines both
within and between offices. Customers, public creditors, brokers
and notaries also demanded a timely service from the Bank’s staff
thereby reinforcing the tyranny of the clock. The majority of those
who worked for the Bank would, therefore, have been aware of the
clock and many would have been all too aware of their obligation
to complete work by certain inescapable deadlines.
The senior men’s inclination towards leaving the Bank at the
earliest opportunity each day suggests a common feeling that this
system of working was not agreeable. This should not surprise us.
Employers during the transition to industrial capitalism often
argued that men had a high preference for leisure and a
resistance to timed work.126 The Bank’s inspectors seemed
somewhat inclined to share such feelings. In the conclusion to
their reports, they noted ‘the various discordant humours &
passions of Men, & the natural unwillingness to obey, where no
distinct line is drawn, of Power on one side, or of Obedience on
the other’. And yet they also acknowledged that ‘on the whole . . .
after a minute enquiry we have found no very material causes of
complaint subsisting either in regard to their [the clerks’]
behavior towards one another, or in regard to the conduct of
their business’.127 Moreover, as we have seen, the junior men
who could not escape the tyranny of the clock found ways of
126 Thompson, ‘Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism’.
127 BEA, M5/213, fo. 152.
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using the constraints of timed work and the notion of service to
the public to improve their own working conditions. This is
indicative of their internalization of clock time and
demonstrates that, while the impact of industrial capitalism on
time-discipline remains contested, by the late eighteenth century
financial capitalism had entrenched regular time at the Bank of
England and in the minds of its clerks.
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